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Why CDFs in Africa?: Representation 






Since 2002, constituency development funds (CDFs) have been established in 
nine African countries, and another two countries have created 
“approximations” of CDFs in that they address the perceived need by members 
of the legislature for budgeted funds to spend on the development of the districts 
they represent.  Thus, just under one-quarter of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa have adopted some type of CDF.  In this paper, we consider three 
alternative explanations for the apparent popularity of CDFs.  Using data from 
the African Legislature Project and Afrobarometer, we find that the best account 
of the rise of CDFs is that while MP rightly perceive the need to maintain close 
contact with their constituents, they wrongly believe that their constituents look 
to them mainly for “pork.”  Instead, African constituents’ primary expectations 
of their MP is that they regularly visit the district to learn what is on their 
minds, and to then quite literally “re-present” or transmit these views back to 
the central government via the legislature.  In other words, while citizens 
desire stronger representation of their needs at the centre, MPs respond by 
delivering services and favours at the periphery (i.e. the district) thinking 
mistakenly that the CDFs are the answer to what the public wants.    We also 
find little evidence of “good governance” advocates that CDFs lead to 





The purpose of this paper is to explore the political and societal contexts that 
give rise to constituency development funds generally, and across sub-Saharan 
Africa in particular.  Since 2002, constituency development funds (CDFs) have 
been established in nine African countries,
1
 and another two countries have 
                                           
1
 We consider a country to have established a CDF when specific legislation has been passed 
and signed into law to create such funds, and when the legislation specifies some amount of 
money or budgetary formula to implement CDFs for all legislative constituencies (i.e. 
districts).  Legislation that establishes CDFs also specifies the procedures to be followed for 
the allocation of the funds within each constituency, i.e. whether by the elected representative 
of the district alone or via a committee of which the representative may or may not be a 
member.   
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created “approximations” of CDFs in that they address the perceived need by 
members of the legislature for budgeted funds to spend on the development of 
the districts they represent.
2
  Thus, just under one-quarter of the 48 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa have adopted some type of CDF. 
 
In this discussion we consider three alternative explanations for the apparent 
popularity of CDFs.  The first potential explanation revolves around the 
conventional wisdom or “pork-barrel” argument.  In Africa, this argument 
would proceed from the basic fact that CDF’s and their approximations exist 
only in countries that elect their legislators from single member districts.  It 
would conclude from this that CDFs or their approximations have been created 
by African MPs as a response to constant and intense constituent pressure “to 
deliver” both private (such as jobs or cash handouts for school fees, health 
dispensary bills) and public goods (such as development projects to build 
schools, roads, and health clinics) and thus increase their prospects for re-
election.  Even in one-party dominant party systems, MPs still have good 
reasons to worry about re-election.  On average, between half to two thirds of 
incumbent MPs lose their seats in African elections, often through party 
primaries as much as in the general election.  Stated simply, these MPs view 
CDFs as a critical element of their job security. 
 
The “pork-barrel” explanation would also appear to make intuitive sense given 
two conditions that are widely prevalent across Africa.  First, most African 
countries are both ethnically plural and agrarian societies.  The result is that 
most people tend to define their political interests in terms of their geographical 
place of residence and the dominant identities of those areas.  Second, political 
parties in Africa are weak with the result that election campaigns for both the 
executive and the legislature tend to be driven by candidate-centered clientelist 
organisations, often fuelled by the distribution of private goods to political 
supporters, rather than by programmatic political parties with clear alternative 
programs for public policy.  Indeed, the prevalence of clientelism is a product of 
the composition and economy of African society.  When combined with the 
election of members of parliament (MPs) from single member districts, these 
                                           
2
 Ghana and Nigeria have approximations of CDFs.  In Ghana, 5 percent of the District 
Common Fund is automatically re-allocated by law to the parliamentary constituencies 
existing within each district.  In Nigeria, each MP is provided with an annual “constituency 
allowance” of 2,000,000 Naira ($12,500) to spend as he or she determines.  In Ghana, 
legislation to create a stand-alone CDF was introduced in 2009 and supported by then 
President John Atta Mills prior to his death and parliamentary elections in 2012, but the 
legislation has yet to become law.  In addition, the possibility of CDF legislation has also 





conditions put pressure on MPs to provide for the geographic constituency they 
have been elected to represent.  
  
The “pork-barrel” explanation is also consistent with early research on what 
legislators do when back in their districts.  In his landmark study Homestyle 
published in 1978, Richard Fenno found that members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives spend considerable time identifying “pork barrel” type projects 
desired by their constituents because they were preoccupied with the prospects 
of reelection (Fenno, 1978).  Barkan found the same type of behavior in an early 
study of Kenyan MPs under the “competitive one-party regime” in which MPs 
faced competitive elections within the single ruling party similar to American 
party primaries.  Indeed, the variance in the vote share obtained by incumbents 
was largely explained by citizen evaluations of how successful their MPs were 
at delivering development projects back to the constituency (Barkan, 1976; 
Barkan, 1978).  
 
A second explanation for the emergence of CDFs is a “counter-intuitive” 
argument about MP misperceptions, or what we call the “mismatch” argument.  
Here, MPs rightly perceive the need to maintain close contact with their 
constituents, but wrongly believe that their constituents look to them mainly for 
“pork.” Instead, African constituents’ primary expectations of their MP is that 
they regularly visit the district to learn what is on their minds, and to then quite 
literally “re-present” or transmit these views back to the central government via 
the legislature.  In other words, while citizens desire stronger representation of 
their needs at the centre, MPs respond by delivering services and favours at the 
periphery (i.e. the district) thinking mistakenly that the CDFs are the answer to 
what the public wants.  One indication of the validity of this mismatch argument 
is the finding that reelection rates in the countries that have established CDFs do 
not appear to have risen compared to the period before there were CDFs. 
 
The third potential explanation focuses on the role of a category of MPs we call 
“institutionalists” or “institutional reformers”; that is to say, “members who are 
intent on transforming their institution from a weak rubber stamp of the 
executive into a modern autonomous legislature” (Barkan, 2009: 18).  The logic 
is as follows.  As Fenno (1978) pointed out over thirty years ago, legislators’ 
personal goals cannot simply be reduced to re-election.  At least some legislators 
desire a greater degree of personal influence in the political process.  Under 
Africa’s one-party regimes, African MPs often satisfied this need by making 
themselves crucial links in “big man” networks, frequently becoming “little big 
men” in their own constituencies.  Since the return of multi-party politics, 
however, some things have begun to change.  As Barkan and his colleagues 
have noted (2009), at least some African MPs have started to pursue political 
influence not through their role back in the constituency, but through the 
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legislature as an institution.  Though they are a minority of all MPs, these 
“institutionalists” have in some cases been able to join together with a larger 
group of “opportunists” to bring about crucial reforms that have strengthened 
the capacity and power of their institution (Barkan, 2009).  
 
However, “institutionalists” face a key problem. While they want to devote 
much of their time to writing legislation and conducting oversight, this comes at 
the cost of less time for travelling back home to visit and listen to constituents 
and conduct constituency service.  Thus, “institutionalists” incur the greatest risk 
of losing the support of their constituents when they stand for reelection.  For 
this reason, institutional reformers are sensitive to the need to provide all MPs 
with adequate salaries, travel allowances, and other forms of support to enable 
them to devote more time and energy to legislating and oversight while 
simultaneously tending to constituents’ needs.  Viewed from this perspective, a 
major goal behind the establishment of CDFs is quite clear.  CDFs not only help 
MPs deal with their constituents and raise their prospects for reelection, they 
also free MPs to become better legislators within the legislature and, by so 
doing, contribute to the emergence of the institution.   
 
Some critics, usually civil society activists concerned with “good governance” 
have argued that CDFs often lead to corruption.  Although these downside risks 
are real, the establishment of CDFs is part of a larger process of institution-
building by those committed to advancing that project.  As such, CDFs are also 
part of the larger process of democratisation.  This is because legislatures–as 
institutions of countervailing power—are essential institutions for the realisation 
of democracy because they scrutinize and check the power of the executive 
branch and hold the executive to account.   
 
Legislatures are particularly important for democratisation across Africa because 
of the continent’s history, since independence, of neo-patrimonial or “big man” 
regimes.  With a few exceptions,
3
 all of sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 countries have 
resumed multiparty elections since 1989, though as of the end of 2012, only 
eleven were classified by Freedom House as “liberal democracies,”
4
 and another 
six as “electoral democracies”
5
 (Puddington, 2013).  Pointing to Steven Fish’s 
(2006) cross national evidence of the impact of increases in parliamentary power 
and democratisation, we would argue that many of Africa’s liberal and electoral 
democracies are the countries with the strongest and most powerful legislatures 
vis-à-vis the executive branch.  Their legislatures are no longer rubber stamps, 
but periodically challenge and limit executive power.   
                                           
3
 Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea and Somalia. 
4
 Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and South Africa. 
5
 Comoros, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
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The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections.  In the first, we test 
the three arguments we have just laid out for the popularity of CDFs and why 
some African countries have them while others do not.  In the second, we 
examine the consequences of CDFs. Thus, our focus is on what compels 
parliamentarians to look to CDFs as a mechanism of distributive spending.  We 
will not, however, explore their size, nor how they function.  In both sections, 
our approach will be cross national and comparative using evidence from 17 
countries included in both the African Legislatures Project and Afrobarometer. 
 
 
Table 1: Adoption of CDF’s in Africa* 
 
No Ambiguous Has CDF 
Benin Botswana Kenya (2003) 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi (2007) 
Cabo Verde Nigeria Tanzania (2008) 
Lesotho  Uganda (2005) 
Mali  Zambia (2006) 
Mozambique  Zimbabwe (2010) 
Namibia   
Senegal   
South  Africa   
 
* Limited to countries included in Afrobarometer Round 4 and African Legislatures Project 
(N=17). 
 
Before we turn to the relevant data, three caveats about CDFs should be kept in 
mind.  First, their establishment in Africa is a recent development of the first 
decade of the 21
st
 Century.  They have not been around very long, and they are 
still relatively few in number.  As previously noted, and as indicated in Table 1, 
only twelve sub-Saharan African countries either have CDFs, their 
approximations, or are considering their adoption.  Second, because they are 
both new and few, little is known about how they operate or vary in the way 
they are constructed or in the benefits they bring to constituents and MPs.  
Indeed, a major purpose of this volume, and one addressed in the chapters that 
follow, is to provide initial insight into the operations of CDFs.  Third, 
notwithstanding the fact that CDFs are new and few, their popularity in the 
countries where they have been established appears to be high amongst both 
members of the public and MPs.  MPs like them because they are a highly 
visible mechanism in providing resources to constituents.  Citizens like them, 
because they view the CDF for their constituency as a helpful entitlement that 
cannot be taken away or reallocated to the members of some “other” region or 
ethnic community.  The number of African countries establishing CDFs is 
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therefore likely to rise, as it is increasing elsewhere around the world.  Put 
simply, CDFs are an idea whose time has come. 
 
 
Explaining the Presence of CDFs in Africa 
 
Country Context Variables 
 
We begin our exploration of the context of CDFs in Africa by examining the 
impact of three country level variables:  (1) the type of electoral system a 
country uses to elect the members of its national legislature; (2) whether the 
country was once a British colony; and (3) whether the country is located in 
Eastern or Southern Africa. 
 
As indicated above, by the end of 2012 nine African countries had established 
CDFs:  Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda,
6
 Sierra Leone, South Sudan, 
Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Two countries, Ghana and Nigeria had 
established approximations of CDFs while the members of the national 
legislature in a third, Botswana, had expressed interest in creating such funds.  
When viewed against the backdrop of all 45 countries that currently have 
legislatures elected through multi-party elections, it is apparent that CDFs are 
more likely to be established in some types of countries than others, and that 
country context is an important determinant of where CDFs exist, regardless of 
whether there is a demand for them by citizens and/or MPs.  As shown in Table 
2, and as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, African countries that elect 
the members of its national legislature from single member districts (SMDs) are 
far more likely to have CDFs than those which do not.  In fact, no legislatures 
elected from multi-member districts by proportional representation (PR) have, or 
anticipate creating, a CDF.  Thus, legislators elected to respond to the needs of 
constituencies defined solely by their common geographic area of residence are 
far more likely to respond to such expectations than legislators elected to 
respond to constituencies defined by their support for a particular political 
party.
7
   
                                           
6
 It should be noted that Uganda ended its six year experiment with CDFs in 2011, because 
MPs regarded the amount of funds allocated to the funds as too small and insufficient for 
achieving their purpose. 
7
 In sixteen of these 45 sub-Saharan African countries, all citizens elect a legislator to the 
lower house of the legislature from a single member district with a plurality rule, though some 
complement this with members elected by proportional representation from parallel or top-up 
multi-member lists or with appointed members (Botswana, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 




Table 2: Comparing National Predictors of CDFs (45 SSA Countries)  
 
 Country Elects All 
MPs From Single 
Member Districts 




In East or 
Southern Africa 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Country Has 
CDF 50% 0% 64% 0% 35% 8% 
Ambiguous 19% 0% 21% 0% 5% 8% 
Country Does  
Not Have CDF 25% 100% 14% 100% 60% 84% 
N =  16 29 14 31 20 25 
 
Note: N=45:  Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with functioning legislatures chosen through 
multiparty elections as of 2011.  For those countries with CDFs, democracy ratings are for the 
year preceding passing of CDF enabling legislation.  
 
The seventeen countries included in the African Legislatures Project can 
therefore be grouped into three categories as depicted in Table 1—those that do 
not have CDFs, those we label as “ambiguous”, and those that have established 
the funds. 
 
SMDs are largely though not exclusively a legacy of British colonialism.  Some 
former French colonies elect MPs from single member districts, but others 
employ a second round runoff majority run-off, or use parallel systems featuring 
multi-member districts, or list proportional representation.  That said, we note 
that no Francophone or Lusophone country has created a CDF.  At the same 
time, not all Anglophone countries have created CDFs (e.g. Lesotho).  And not 
all Anglophone countries retained the plurality SMD system (e.g. South Africa).  
Thus, another important factor appears to be region: countries located in East 
and Southern Africa are far more likely to have a CDF than elsewhere in the 
continent. 
 
That almost all former British colonies located in Eastern and Southern Africa 
which use a common system of running elections have CDFs, suggests the 
presence of a significant contagion effect.  It diffuses through legislators from 
neighbouring countries with a shared colonial heritage and official language 
who are likely to be aware of each other’s efforts to strengthen the legislature 
and especially efforts to improve the terms of service for MPs.  MPs from these 
countries, especially activists within the legislature, periodically interact with 
each other at regional forums and meetings of the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association, African Parliamentary Association, or the Southern African 
Development Community Parliamentary Forum, where they compare notes on 
their respective experiences.  For example, when members of the Uganda 
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National Assembly raised their salaries in the late 1990s, members of the Kenya 
National Assembly took note and followed suit in 2001. Similarly, in 2001, the 
Uganda National Assembly asserted itself again by passing the Budget Act 
which gave itself increased powers in the budget making process. The Kenya 
National Assembly followed with their own and more ambitious budget act in 
2007. Conversely, when members of the Kenya National Assembly established 
CDFs in 2003, the members of neighbouring parliaments soon sought CDFs for 
themselves.  Though impossible to measure quantitatively, the likely impact of 
such cross national learning appears profound.  
 
However, while these macro level linkages are tantalizing, without micro level 
evidence, we can only guess at the underlying mechanisms driving them.  
Fortunately, we do have such data.  We thus turn to evidence derived from two 
cross-national research projects conducted in 17 African countries. The first is 
the African Legislatures Project (ALP) which carried out surveys of 838 
legislators randomly chosen from the legislatures of 17 countries.
8
 The standard 
ALP study conducted face-to-face surveys of random and representative 
samples of 50 members in each country.
9
 The surveys of MPs were conducted 
between 2008 and 2012. The second is Round 4 of the Afrobarometer public 
opinion survey, which carried out surveys in 20 countries in 2008-2009. A 
standard Afrobarometer survey consists of face-to-face surveys of random, 
nationally representative samples of 1,200 respondents (larger samples are used 
in Nigeria and South Africa). The rest of this chapter focuses on the 17 countries 





One of the reasons that we see such sharp differences between Anglophone and 
other Sub-Saharan countries may lie in the political culture that has developed 
based initially on the traditions inherited from the United Kingdom, but 
subsequently maintained by SMD plurality electoral systems. In this context, it 
is likely that the citizens of Anglophone societies have learned to expect their 
MPs to focus their activities on the local district, listening to people and securing 
private and public goods for constituents. In contrast to this “localist” 
orientation, Francophone and Lusophone societies may have inherited a tradition 
consistent with the centralised political systems of their respective colonial 
                                           
8
 For a full description of the methodologies employed for the African Legislatures Project 
and for the Afrobarometer, readers are directed to www.africanlegislaturesproject.org and 
www.afrobarometer.org .   
9
 A somewhat larger sample of 60 members was interviewed in Nigeria while smaller samples 
of 40 MPs were interviewed in Benin and Namibia.  
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powers where legislators are expected to focus their attention on “les affaires de 
la nation” and citizens develop significantly different orientations toward the 
role of the MP.  
 
To test the argument that the presence of CDFs is a response to the national 
political culture, we turn to responses to two questions from Afrobarometer 
Round 4.  The first question gives respondents a forced choice between two 
statements that when electing a member of parliament they “prefer to vote for a 
candidate who can deliver goods and services to people in this community” or 
“prefer to vote for a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in 
our country.”  In Table 3, we display the relationship between preferences for a 
locally oriented MP by the country’s status with regard to CDFs. Both of the 
countries (i.e. Malawi and Tanzania) with the highest levels of “localist” 
orientations—over 60 percent—have CDFs, whereas none of the countries with 
low levels (under 30 percent) have them. There is a clear and strong relationship 
between the presence of CDFs and political culture, expressed either in 
categories (Tau b=.736***) or as an absolute percentage of localist orientations 
(Pearson’s r=.730***). Moreover, with one exception, all of those with low 
levels are either Francophone or Lusophone in their colonial heritage. 
 
 
Table 3: CDF Status by Citizen Demand for Locally-Focused MPs 
 
 <30% 30-60% >60% 



















Burkina Faso (13%) 





Note: Kendall’s Tau b = .736**** / Pearson’s r = .730***, N=17.  
“Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 
2. Statement 1: In electing a Member of Parliament, I prefer to vote for a candidate who can 
deliver goods and services to people in this community.  Statement 2: In electing a Member of 
Parliament, I prefer to vote for a candidate who can make policies that benefit everyone in our 
country.” Cells display the percentage of respondents in that country who choose Statement 1.  




The second Afrobarometer question asked respondents “Which of the following 
do you think is the most important responsibility of your Member of 
Parliament:”  (1) “listen to constituents and represent their needs,” (2) “deliver 
jobs or development projects back to the constituency,” (3) “make laws for the 
good of the country,” or (4) “monitor the president and his government?”  The 
results are displayed in Table 4.  All three countries where 60 percent or more of 
the respondents say that MPs should “listen to constituents” have CDFs whereas 
none of the countries with very low expectations of representation (those under 
30 percent) have them or contemplate getting them.  Again, there is a strong 
relationship, whether demand for representation is expressed as ordinal 
categories (Tau b=.664***) or as an absolute percentage (Pearson’s r=.795***) 
 
 
Table 4: CDF Status by Citizen Demand for MPs to Listen to Their 
Constituents 
 
 <30% 30-60% >60% 
























Note: Kendall’s Tau b = .664*** / Pearson’s r = .795***, N=17.  
“Members of Parliament have different responsibilities.  Which of the following do you think 
is the most important responsibility of your Member of Parliament:  1. Listen to constituents 
and represent their needs. 2. Deliver jobs or development projects back to the constituency.  3.  
Make laws for the good of the country.  4. Monitor the president and his government.”  Cells 
display the percentage of respondents who choose Option 1.   





We have thus far interpreted the results to these questions as a preference for a 
“localist” oriented MP. Yet one might be tempted to interpret the responses to 
the first question (“deliver goods and services to people in this constituency”) as 
a preference for clientelist delivery of private goods. Much depends on whether 
one focuses on the contrast between “goods and services” only for people of this 
area versus “policies that benefit everyone” or on the contrast between 
11 
 
“community” versus “country.”  In order to probe this matter further, we look at 
the percentage who, in the second question, say that the most important role of 
an MP is to “deliver jobs or development projects back to the constituency” and 
examine its relationship with a country’s CDF status (Table 5).  In this case, 
there is no statistically significant association between citizens’ beliefs that MPs 
ought to produce economic goods and whether the country had established a 
CDF (Tau b=-.353, Pearson’s r=-/247). This suggests that MPs may have 
established CDFs in response to a misperception of what citizens want. To the 
extent that African MPs establish CDFs as a response to demands for 
geographically targeted goods and services, they probably are mistaken. 
 
 
Table 5: CDF Status by Citizen Demand for Jobs and Development in 
Their Constituencies 
 
 <30% 30-60% >60% 





















South Africa (34%) 
Benin (34%) 
Burkina Faso (31%) 
 
 
Note: Kendall’s Tau b = -.353 / Pearson’s r = -.247, N=17. 
“Members of Parliament have different responsibilities.  Which of the following do you think 
is the most important responsibility of your Member of Parliament: 1. Listen to constituents 
and represent their needs. 2. Deliver jobs or development projects back to the constituency. 3 
Make laws for the good of the country. 4. Monitor the president and his government?”  Cells 
display the  percentage of respondents who choose Option 2.   
Source: Afrobarometer, Round 4 
 
Additional evidence of the misperception explanation for CDFs is provided 
when we examine citizens’ role expectations of their MPs and then compare 
them with MPs’ own role orientations.  Figure 1 presents citizens’ responses to 
the Afrobarometer question “Which of the following do you think is the most 
important responsibility of your member of parliament?”  As can be seen, 
citizens express a clear “localist” orientation in that only 13 percent chose 
“making laws,” or legislating, and just 5 percent selected “monitoring the 
president and his government,” or oversight.  By contrast, a combined 78 
percent expressed the view that MPs should focus on their constituents.  
12 
 
However, within this group, far more respondents (45 percent) indicated that 
MPs should listen to their views and represent their needs than those who 





Figure 1: Citizen Role Expectations 
 
Note: Members of Parliament have different responsibilities.  Which of the following do you 
think is the most important responsibility of your Member of Parliament? Listen to 
constituents and represent their needs? Deliver jobs and development to your constituency?  
Make laws for the good of the country?  Monitor the President and his Government?   
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4, N=20,339. 
 
The distinction between the two dimensions of “localist” orientations is even 
more pronounced when citizens’ expectations are compared with MPs’ own role 
orientations.  In its surveys, ALP asked MPs, “In your opinion, which of these 
following jobs is the most important part of being an MP?” as well as “For you 
personally, which role brings you the most satisfaction?”  Figure 2 indicates the 
emphasis MPs place on constituency service relative to the citizens.  When 
African MPs were asked what is “the most important job of an MP” and what is 
the “the most rewarding” part of the job,” constituency service was not only 
cited by more MPs than any other function, but it is also the aspect of their job 
that gives them the greatest job satisfaction.   
 
Across the same 17 countries, there is a 4 percentage point difference between 
the cross-national percentage of MPs (35 percent) who prioritise constituency 
service as the most important role they are expected to perform compared to 
citizens who prioritise constituency service (31 percent).  There is also a 26 
point difference between the overall percentage of citizens who selected 
13 
 
representation (45 percent) compared to MPs (19 percent).  The differences are 
even greater when one compares citizens’ expectations to those MPs regard as 
the most rewarding.  Thus, while citizens are more likely than MPs to emphasize 
representation, they are less likely to focus on constituency service.  Although 
both citizens and MPs emphasize tasks that take place in the constituency and 
outside the parliament itself, they subscribe to very different interpretations of 





Figure 2: Citizen Role Expectations and MP Role Expectations 
Compared 
 
Note: “In your opinion, which of these following jobs is the most important part of being an 
MP?” And “For you personally, which role brings you the most satisfaction?”  For both 
questions, the responses were: “Debating bills and passing laws? Making public policy by 
writing laws? Overseeing the executive? Bringing development to your [constituency]? 
Representing constituents’ views in parliament? Assisting constituents with their personal 
problems? Or soliciting funds for your constituency?”  
Source: African Legislatures Project MP Survey 
 
However, the cross national percentage difference is far less illuminating than 
the difference by country.  Once we calculate the citizen-MP gap in emphasis on 
representation, we find that the greater the gap between citizens and MPs, the 
more likely the country in question will have established a constituency 
development fund (Table 6).  In Burkina Faso, citizens are actually less likely 
than MPs to choose representation (-14 point difference).  In Uganda and 
Tanzania, in contrast, the gap between citizens’ demands for representation and 




What we see in Table 6 is that CDFs exist in those countries with a very high 
gap, or level of misperception about what citizens want from their MPs (i.e. +30 
points or more).  Indeed, the relationship is striking (Tau b=.830***).  MPs in 
these societies accurately perceive citizen demands for a local orientation, but 
misperceive this as a demand for goods, services or favours, rather than 
representation.  A crude, but apt analogy might be that of an amorous suitor who 
showers the object of his affection with jewels and expensive clothes, while the 
woman secretly confides to her friends that “I just want someone to listen to 
me.”   
 
 
Table 6: CDF Status by Citizens-MPs Gap in Emphasis on 
Representation 
 
 -30-0 +1-30 +31-60 










Nigeria  (+32) 
Country Does Not 
Have CDF 






South Africa (+8) 
Namibia (+6) 
 Benin (+3) 
 
 
Note: Kendall’s Tau b = .830*** / Pearson’s r=.792***, N=17. 
The number for each country is the percentage point difference between the percentage of 
Afrobarometer respondents minus the percentage of MPs from each country who answered 
that listening to constituents and representing their needs is the most important job for MPs to 
perform.   
Sources: African Legislature Project MP Survey; Afrobarometer, Round 4. 
 
In sum, although MPs frequently speak about the pressures they are under to 
provide jobs and development projects back to their districts, and although their 
establishment of CDFs is a logical response, it appears that when aggregated at 
the country level—which is the level at which the decision to establish or not 
establish CDFs is made—the funds are most likely to be found in the countries 
where MPs misread the desires of their constituents the most.    
15 
 
Parliamentary Reform and Parliamentary 
Strengthening 
 
As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a third possible explanation for the 
spread of CDFs is that they are supported by reform-minded MPs who see it as a 
way to strengthen the legislature as an institution of countervailing power vis-à-
vis the executive branch.  Because CDFs are assumed to raise MPs’ prospects 
for reelection generally, it is also assumed that that they protect 
“institutionalists” who are the MPs most vulnerable at the polls.  If true, then 
countries with the highest percentages of MPs who can be classified as 
institutionalists or “reformers,” should also be those with CDFs. 
 
 
Table 7: CDF Status by MP Support for Parliamentary Reform 
 
 <30% 30-60% >60% 










Country Does Not 
Have CDF 
Mozambique (28%) 
South Africa (14%) 
Lesotho (43%) 
Namibia (39%) 





Note: Kendall’s Tau b = .214 / Pearson’s r = .539*, N=15 (Questions not asked in Nigeria or 
Zambia). 
“Regardless of whether your country already has this please tell us whether you support or 
oppose measures that would allow this Parliament to: 1. Increase the number of sitting days 
for the Parliament; 2. Set salaries for MPs and Staff; 3. Increase oversight of the executive; 4. 
Approve senior appointments to the civil service.”  Cells display the percentage of MPs who 
support all four reform proposals.   
Source: African Legislatures Project MP Survey.  
 
To test this proposition, we turn to a series of questions asked in the ALP MP 
surveys which attempted to tap support for institutional reform.  In particular, 
we use the responses to four questions that asked MP: (1) Whether parliament 
should have increased powers to oversee the executive branch; (2) whether 
parliament should increase the number of days it is in session; (3) whether the 
salaries of MPs should be increased; and (4) whether parliament should have the 
power to approve appointments to the senior civil service.  MPs answering “yes” 
to all four questions were categorized as reformers.   
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With the exception of Benin, the greater the percentage of reformist MPs in a 
given legislature, the more likely the parliament of that country will have passed 
legislation establishing CDFs (Pearson’s r = .539*).  Indeed, Benin is a clear 
outlier where MPs are twice as likely as their colleagues in other Francophone 
legislatures to support a full basket of reforms.  If we removed Benin from the 
analysis, the correlation becomes even stronger (Pearson’s r = .646**).  Put 
differently, this corroborates the argument that MPs see CDFs as part of the 
same basket of other reforms designed to strengthen their institution even 
though they address that part of the MPs’ job that exists outside the legislature.  
 
 
The Consequences and Impact of CDFs 
 
In this section, we move from probing arguments about the spread of CDFs in 
Africa, to a test of conventional propositions about their impact.  In particular, 
we investigate whether CDFs have changed MP behavior by allowing them to 
spend less time travelling home and focus more time on activities that build the 
legislature as an institution.  Second, we examine whether or not CDFs have 
resulted in more positive views of MPs in particular (specific support) or the 





In what ways have CDFs shaped the activities MPs undertake back in their 
constituencies?  As we have demonstrated, CDFs tend to occur in those 
countries where MPs are most likely to perceive intense constituent demands for 
frequent visits and constituency service, as well as in those legislatures with 
high levels of support for institution-strengthening reforms.  Has the existence of 
CDFs reduced MPs perceived need to travel home and engage in constituency 
service?  To test this, we examine MP responses to a series of questions in the 
ALP survey about the frequency of their travel home, and the amount of money 
they spend on travel and other types of constituency service.   
 
As shown in Table 8, the establishment of CDFs makes no difference in the 
number of trips MPs make back to their constituencies while parliament is in 
session.  In both countries with CDFs and those without, the median MP returns 
to their constituency two times a month (while parliament is in session).  The 
presence or absence of CDFs also appears to have no impact on the duration of 
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each trip, where the median member stays in the constituency three days per trip 
(a typical Friday through Sunday stay).
10
   
 
 
Table 8: MP Behaviour in Constituencies by Access to Constituency 
Funds 
 
  MP Does Not 
Have  Access to 
Constituency 
Funds 
MP Has Access  
to Constituency 
Funds 
Test Statistic N 
Mean Monthly Trips 








Mean Number of 






























(MP Expects To Win 
Re-Election By Large 
Margin) 





Note: Cells display the average response of MPs to each question.  For question wording, see 
Appendix.  
Source:  African Legislatures Project MP Survey. 
 
The presence of CDFs makes a sharper difference in the amounts of funds MPs 
donate to both individuals and local community development projects. In respect 
to the former, in countries that have established CDFs, the median MP donates 
roughly one-third more funds to constituents for personal problems than MPs in 
countries without CDFs.  In terms of donations to local development projects, 
MPs in CDF countries outspend their counterparts by a four to one margin.  
These differences are very large, but whether they are due to MPs’ access to 
CDFs, or access to other state provided allowances that support their work in 
their constituencies, or to donations that come out of their own pockets, or to 
some combination of all three, cannot be determined from our data.  The 
magnitude of these differences, however, suggests that some of these monies do 
                                           
10
  In this section, we report medians since the data on travel and spending is skewed by a 
smaller number of MPs who travel home far more frequently (usually because they live in 
districts close to the legislative capital) or who spend very large amounts of money. 
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come from the CDF.  Indeed, MPs constantly strive to control or at least 
influence disbursements from CDFs in countries where they exist.  On the other 
hand, civil society organizations and other watchdog groups argue that CDFs are 
misused precisely because MPs seek to use the funds to solidify their positions 
back home.   
 
What about the impact of CDFs on MP’s prospects for re-election at the next 
election?  A major motivation of MPs when passing legislation to establish 
CDFs was the need to address the high probability of electoral defeat.  This was 
particularly true for legislators devoting increased time to their duties inside the 
legislature. Evidence supporting this interpretation comes from an ALP question 
that asks MPs about their re-election prospects.  A significantly greater 
percentage of MPs with access to CDFs (58 percent) expect to win re-election 
“by a large margin” than those in countries without (33 percent).  Whether the 
rates of reelection are actually higher in countries with CDFs, we cannot say at 
this stage of our analysis.  Anecdotal data from Kenya and Uganda, however, 
suggest that CDFs have not raised the prospects for reelection as much as MPs 
expected.
11
 Indeed, in Kenya, the reelection rate for incumbents has declined 
since the CDF was established. 
 
 
MP Time Allocation 
 
Notwithstanding the finding that MPs appear to view the establishment of CDFs 
as part of the same basket of reforms that strengthen the legislature, the actual 
impact of CDFs is not so simple.  Table 9 examines the relationship between 
whether or not a country has established a CDF and how members of the 
legislature report allocating their time to various activities.  Just as MPs who 
have access to CDFs are no less likely to travel home, neither are they any less 
likely to apportion their time to constituency matters or any more likely to 
devote time to committee or plenary work (in fact, the difference is slightly in 
the opposite direction).  For example, MPs in countries without CDFs devote an 
average of 24 percent of their time to participating in plenary sessions of the 
legislature compared to 21 percent in countries where MPs have access to CDFs.  
Similarly, MPs in countries without CDFs devote an average of 26 percent of 
their time to serving on committees within the legislature compared to 21 
percent in countries with CDFs.   
 
 
                                           
11
 For example, in 2007 in Kenya when the first parliamentary elections were held following 
the establishment of CDFs in that country in 2003, 72 percent of the incumbent MPs—a 
record high—were not re-elected to the next parliament. 
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Table 9: MP Time Allocation by Access to Constituency Funds 
 
 MP Does Not 
Have  Access to 
Constituency 
Funds 






Plenary 24% 21% .117*** 796 
Committee 26% 21% .181*** 761 
Party Meetings 16% 11% .233*** 723 
Constituency 24% 31% .228*** 783 
 
Note: Cells display the average percentage of time MPs report spending on each type of the 
four listed activities.  
“In a year, what percentage of your time is devoted to each of the following?” 
Source:  African Legislatures Project MP Survey 
 
To be sure, these differences do not only reflect the presence or absence of 
CDFs, but also the type of electoral system and whether the MP operates in a 
one-party dominant system or a highly competitive one.  Since no country that 
elects its national legislature via PR has established CDFs, it is not surprising 
that the percentage of MPs who devote the most time to party meetings and the 
least amount of time to constituency work, are the countries that have not 
established CDFs.  At the same time, this data cautions us against making any 




Support for MPs 
 
Regardless of their electoral fates, do CDFs allow MPs to deliver a sufficient 
amount of goods and favours to their constituency to affect citizens’ evaluations 
of the legislature and its members in any material way?  To test this, we turn to a 
series of Afrobarometer questions that ask people for their evaluations of the MP 
in terms of responsiveness, corruption, trust and overall performance.  But as 
demonstrated in Table 10, citizens’ evaluations of MPs are not substantially 
higher, and if anything are worse, in countries that have CDFs compared to does 
that do not.  By the smallest of margins, and well within the margin of error, 
slightly more citizens in countries with CDFs (30 percent) report that their MP 
visits the constituency at least once a month, compared to citizens in countries 
without (27 percent).  That said, slightly few people (19 percent compared to 22 
percent) believe their MP is interested in public opinion and what citizens have 
to say.  On the other hand, the percentage of citizens in countries with CDFs 
who believe that they are able to make their MP listen to them (30 percent) is 
higher than the percentage in countries without CDFs (23 percent).  Citizens in 
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countries with CDFs are also more likely to regard MPs pejoratively than 
citizens in countries without.  The percentage who think “all or most” MPs are 
involved in corruption is higher in countries with CDFs—perhaps because they 
have or are perceived as having access to these funds— while the percentage 
who approve of the job performance of their MP is less  (45 compared to 50 
percent).  While not definitive, taken together, these findings strongly suggest 
that CDFs do not provide MPs with a political advantage that some might wish 
to use if they spend more time engaging the legislative process or exercising 
oversight within the legislature. 
 
 
Table 10: CDFs and Citizen Views of MPs 
 


















22% 19% -.020** 20,399 
Able to Make 
MP Listen 




23% 31% .060*** 20,399 
Approve MP Job 
Performance 
50% 46% -.086*** 20,400 
 
Note: Cells display the average response of respondents to each question.  For question 
wording, see Appendix.   
Source:  Afrobarometer, Round 4. 
 
 
Support for the Legislature 
 
Finally, we turn to the question of whether CDFs materially affect citizens’ 
support for the legislature as an institution, especially its law making and 
oversight functions.  By modest margins, citizens in countries that have 
established CDFs are more likely to support legislative autonomy with respect to 
law making and oversight, two defining functions of the legislature.  Citizens in 
countries with CDFs are also more likely to reject the idea that parliament 
should be shut down and replaced with presidential dictatorship. Again, 
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however, the differences between the two groups of countries are not 
overwhelming though they are consistent with the argument that CDFs help 
strengthen the autonomy of the legislature.  At the same time, citizens in CDF 
countries are less likely to trust the legislature as an institution than in countries 
without CDFs, perhaps because they are suspicious of MP corruption in the 
administration of the funds. Once again, however, these finding could be a 
function of the type of electoral system and whether or not citizens reside in a 
one party dominant political system where the legislature is arguably more 
likely to follow a predictable path in respect to its approach to public policy.   
 
 
Table 11: CDFs and Citizen Support for the Legislature 
 
 MP Does Not Have  
Access to 
Constituency Funds 







Autonomy  in Law 
making 
60% 69% .098*** 20,398 
Supports Legislative 
Oversight 
57% 63% .063*** 20,398 
Rejects Shutting 
Down Parliament and 
Allowing President to 
Rule 
75% 85% .128*** 20,397 
Trusts Legislature 
a Lot 
33% 26% -.049*** 20,398 
 
Note: Cells display the average response of respondents to each question.  For question 
wording, see Appendix.   





In this chapter, we first employed relevant data from the African Legislatures 
Project and the Afrobarometer to test three alternative hypotheses about the 
spread of CDFs in Africa.  In our view, the best evidence supports the MP 
misperception hypothesis.  That is, in the countries with CDFs, MPs have 
correctly gauged the extent of popular demand for a “localist” MP style, or an 
African form of “home style.”  At the same time, this is precisely where MPs get 
it wrong and interpret these localist orientations as a demand for the delivery of 
goods and favours to the district, and miss the fact that what citizens want is for 
their elected representatives to listen to their concerns and facilitate a suitable 
government response. They want to be represented in the decision making 
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processes of the state so that public policy responds to their needs and their 
preferences.  However, while the establishment of CDFs may be a response to 
MP misperceptions of public opinion, they may in the long run contribute to 
what citizens do want—better social service delivery, infrastructure, etc. back in 
their constituency—that is to say, the very public goods they seem to eschew 
when they emphasize the need for MPs to listen to and represent their concerns.  
This is a paradox, but one that broadens our understanding of the significance of 
CDFs and why the spread of these funds to other countries will no doubt 
increase. 
 
Second, this chapter has explored the contexts within which CDFs operate and 
offered some preliminary assessments of the impact of the funds, particularly 
with respect to contributing to reforms to strengthen African legislatures on the 
one hand, and sustaining the careers of key parliamentary players on the other.  
The data presented suggests that the “CW pork barrel” explanation of why CDFs 
are established, though logically persuasive, is not supported by the available 
evidence.  CDFs do not appear to enhance the stature of MPs or their prospects 
for re-election.  Though arguably viewed by MPs as part of a larger basket of 
institution-strengthening reforms, the impact of CDFs may be just the opposite.  
MPs in countries with CDFs do not spend more time in plenary sessions of the 
legislature than MPs in countries without the funds.  Nor do they devote more 
time to the work of parliamentary committees, the heart of modern legislatures, 
or less time back in their constituencies.  Finally, when back in their districts, 
MPs in countries with CDFs seem to dish out more cash in the form of both 
private goods to individuals and public goods in the form of donations to local 
community development projects.  Put differently, CDFs do not seem to 
contribute to the development of the legislature as an institution of 
countervailing power that is more likely to hold the executive accountable for its 
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When Parliament is in session: 
-How many trips did you make to your constituency during a typical month? 
-On average, how long did you stay (in days)? 
 
Members of Parliament often incur significant costs in constituency service.  What is your 
best estimate of each of the following? 
-The average contributions you personally make to individual constituents to help them with 
personal problems per month?  IN [LOCAL CURRENCY] PER MONTH 
-The average contributions you personally make to local community development projects per 
month (excluding [Constituency Development Funds])?  IN [ LOCAL CURRENCY ] PER 
MONTH  
 





How much time does your Member of Parliament spend in this constituency? 
 
How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like 
you have to say:  members of Parliament? 
 
In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make your 
Member of Parliament listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the 
community? 
 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you 
heard enough about them to say: Members of Parliament? 
 
Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs 






Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 
2.     
Statement 1:  Members of Parliament represent the people; therefore they should make laws 
for this country, even if the President does not agree. 
Statement 2:  Since the President represents all of us, he should pass laws without worrying 




Statement 1:  Parliament should ensure that the President explains to it on a regular basis how 
his government spends the taxpayers’ money. 
Statement 2:  The President should be able to devote his full attention to developing the 
country rather than wasting time justifying his actions. 
 
There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following 
alternatives?  Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide 
everything. 
 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to 
say?  Parliament 
 
